When a former partner gained control of the Tesla app linked to a Model 3, the remote features intended for safety became tools of intimidation.
From shared ownership to a single-person login
Stacey purchased the electric sedan while she and Enrico Pucci were still dating. The vehicle was registered in Pucci’s name after he offered to help her work through the new technology.
Legal filings say Stacey agreed to the transfer solely so Pucci could “assist her” with the app. After the breakup in October 2025, Pucci retained the login credentials.
Parental controls used as a weapon
Within weeks of the split, Pucci activated the app’s parental-control settings. The alarm sounded repeatedly at night, leaving Stacey fearful of checking the car.
He then imposed a series of restrictions that the Tesla Model 3 Owner’s Manual describes as optional features:
- Blocking the web browser, theater and arcade functions
- Sending curfew alerts for trips between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m.
- Requiring safety-feature activation
- Limiting acceleration and capping top speed at a low level
While some limits merely inconvenience a driver, the curfew notifications and speed cap could endanger a person trying to flee a threatening situation.
Full remote access amplifies the threat
Beyond the parental settings, the app let Pucci lock and unlock doors at will. He also toggled the climate system, making the cabin alternately freezing and scorching.
Charging sessions were interrupted, often leaving the battery far from full when Stacey returned home. The combination of temperature swings and a depleted charge added a layer of daily stress.
Perhaps the most unsettling capability was real-time location tracking. Pucci could see where the car was at any moment and used that information to follow her.
Three days after the first remote interference, Pucci followed her in his own vehicle, shouted, “You thought you’d get away with this. I am in your car. I am in your maps,” and threatened her further, police records show.
These actions illustrate how a feature meant for parental oversight can be repurposed for stalking. For victims, the constant knowledge that someone can see their movements and control basic functions turns a modern convenience into a source of fear.
Why the risk extends beyond one brand
Similar remote-location services exist in many manufacturers’ apps, from Ford vans to other mainstream models. No external tracker is needed because the functionality is built into the vehicle’s software.
That means any driver who grants app access to another person—whether a spouse, parent, or valet—creates a potential backdoor if the relationship sours.
Steps to protect a connected car
The first safeguard is to set up a personal account in the manufacturer’s app before anyone else does. Even if the user never opens the app again, the account holds the keys to lock, unlock, locate and adjust the vehicle remotely.
Passwords should stay private, and assistance should come from a trusted source. If access has already been shared, revoking it promptly is essential.
Removing a former partner’s phone from the infotainment system and re-programming any physical keys can block their electronic control, though a traditional key could still open the door.
In practice, owners should check the app’s user list regularly, disable any “parental” or “guest” profiles they no longer need, and consider changing the vehicle’s registration to their own name when possible.
Authorities advise that victims of domestic abuse document any remote-control incidents and report them to law enforcement, as the digital evidence can support stalking charges.
